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The Biter Bit

*

UNKNOWABLE DANGERS, THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT, AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
†

Ellen Wertheimer‡
INTRODUCTION
Strict products liability developed out of a perceived
need to protect consumers from the costs engendered by
defective products. The basic idea was that manufacturers
should be liable for the injuries caused by their defective
products even—maybe especially—in the absence of
manufacturer negligence. Indeed, if it were sufficient for
liability to result only for negligent design, failure to warn, or
mismanufacture, there would have been no need for a new
theory of liability, because negligence-based liability would
have provided adequate consumer protection. It was widely
recognized, however, that negligence-based liability was not
enough, and that manufacturers should be responsible for
injuries caused by the products they designed, labeled,
marketed, and sold, even if their conduct had been reasonable.
*

“The Biter Bit” is an ironic short story by Wilkie Collins. In this story, a
young police officer (the Biter of the title) is himself bitten by his wish to show up the
old guard police force. The analogy here, of course, is that those who would have
eradicated strict products liability in the Third Restatement may well have caused its
rejuvenation, as this article discusses. See Wilkie Collins, The Biter Bit in WILKIE
COLLINS, TALES OF TERROR AND THE SUPERNATURAL 268-94 (1972).
†
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The costs of such injuries had to fall somewhere, and, as
between an innocent plaintiff and an innocent manufacturer,
the courts chose the manufacturer. In order to accomplish this,
the courts needed a new theory of liability, one that went
beyond negligence. When the new theory was codified in the
form of § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts,1 the courts
enthusiastically and almost uniformly adopted it as the law of
their jurisdictions.2 Under strict products liability theory, and
under § 402A, manufacturers would be liable for their defective
products even if the manufacturers had exercised all due care
in the design and manufacturing process.

1

(1)

(2)

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
One who sells any property in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer . . .
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product . . . .

Id.
2

As the court pointed out in Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351,
1356 (D.C. Cir. 1978):
Subsequent to the decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. and the
promulgation of § 402A of the Restatement, the concept of strict liability in
tort spread rapidly. At the date of this writing, the CCH Products Liability
Reporter lists 45 states as having adopted the concept. One other state and
the District of Columbia are cautiously placed on this list with a footnote
reading “inferred by court decision.”
Id. (footnotes omitted); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 513 P.2d 268,
272 (Mont. 1973) (“The trend seems to be to adopt the theory of strict liability as it has
now been adopted by a majority of the states. . . . We adopt the definition, as other
jurisdictions have, set forth in 2 Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A . . . .”); Turner v.
Hudson, 1986 Me. Super. LEXIS 278, at *5 (Me. Dec. 12, 1986) (“In almost every other
jurisdiction, strict liability is common law doctrine. The highest courts of other states
have simply ‘adopted’ § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”); Phipps v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) (“Almost all of the courts of our sister
states have adopted the strict liability principles set forth in § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Several reasons for adopting strict liability are summarized . . . We
find the above reasons persuasive. . . . Therefore, we adopt the theory of strict liability
as expressed in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”). As the court stated in
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 432-33 (N.D. Ind. 1965):
The direction of the law is clear. Again drawing on the language of and
authorities cited by Judge Wisdom in Putman, we find that “Part of the
impetus has come from an almost unanimous call from the authorities in the
field of torts.” If the Restatement correctly states the conditions of recovery
now in practice, let those elements have a fresh name. . . . The question is
now squarely before this court and must be decided. It is perhaps fortuitous
that the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet passed on this issue, but
doubtlessly that forward-looking court would embrace the Restatement
(Second), Torts §402A, and the many recent cases and authors who have done
likewise, as eminently just and as the law of Indiana today.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

2/22/2005 7:18:58 PM

2005]

THE BITER BIT

891

There were three types of defect. Products could be
defective in design, in warning, or in manufacture. All three
types of defect were covered under § 402A by a single rule of
strict liability. Of the three, the last, mismanufactured
products, need not detain us here: manufacturers have for
many decades been liable for mismanufactured products under
a theory of res ipsa loquitur.3 This basis for liability seamlessly
became the mismanufacture doctrine of 402A, and has caused
neither courts nor manufacturers any qualms.
Strict liability for design defects and failure to warn,
however, began causing courts problems as soon as § 402A was
adopted. Most jurisdictions had never imposed liability without
fault in such a broad spectrum of cases, although liability
without fault was not unknown, even in tort cases, where res
ipsa loquitur had come to function as a form of liability without
fault. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., for example, the
defendant manufacturer presented “pretty near infallible”
evidence that it had acted as a reasonable manufacturer in the
bottle-filling and inspection processes,4 but no one was
interested because the bottle exploded.5 It is more than possible
that Coca-Cola was not, in fact, negligent.6 In fact, the plaintiff

3

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (exploding soda

bottle).
4

Id. at 440.
Id. at 439-40:
[T]he evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the
bottle here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery
to the restaurant by defendant. It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in
some matter defective at the time defendant relinquished control, because
sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordinarily
explode when carefully handled. . . . Under the general rules pertaining to
the doctrine, . . . it must appear that bottles of carbonated liquid are not
ordinarily defective without negligence by the bottling company. . . . Although
it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an excessive
charge or a defect in the glass, there is a sufficient showing that neither
cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used.
Id. See also Rizzo v. Corning, Inc., 105 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A carafe designed
to be used for years, not months, breaks in half without being dropped or banged or
cleaned with abrasive cleaners or damaged in a flood or fire. In these unusual
circumstances the accident itself is sufficient evidence of a defect to permit, though of
course not compel, the jury to infer a defect.”); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d
720, 733 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Under Hawaii law, application of res ipsa loquitur raises no
presumption of negligence. The doctrine merely establishes a prima facie case of
negligence; it allows the case to go to the jury.”); Higgins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 699
S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1985) (“Strictly speaking, since proof of negligence is not in
issue, res ipsa loquitur has no application to strict liability; but the inferences which
are the core of the doctrine remain, and are no less applicable.”).
6
As the court pointed out:
5
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admitted that she could not prove negligence on the part of the
defendant.7 The court was not concerned.
Unlike mismanufacture cases, however, failure to warn
and design defect cases presented problems for courts
accustomed to negligence-based liability. In design and failure
to warn cases, courts found it difficult to develop standards
that would differentiate strict liability from negligence,
simplify the plaintiffs’ burden of proof, yet stop short of
imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all productrelated injuries. Negligence had proven inadequate in
providing the level of consumer protection that courts felt was
necessary in the modern era, and plaintiffs’ resources were
viewed as similarly inadequate to compete with the resources
available to manufacturers. But no one felt that all injuries
should be compensated, just those caused by defective
products.8
Two types of defect—in design and in warning—are the
focus of this analysis. The thesis of this article is that courts,
initially enthusiastic about strict products liability, gradually
retreated from their own standards for imposing liability until,
in many jurisdictions, strict products liability ceased to exist.
The Third Restatement of Products Liability, ostensibly
codifying this incremental retreat into black-letter law,
eliminated any strictness from products liability and
transformed it back into a negligence-based doctrine. Some
courts, however, forced to confront the Third Restatement=s
clear recognition of the doctrine’s collapse, subsequently
remembered why they had adopted strict products liability in
the first place and returned to the doctrine. The very
codification of what had been an incremental process forced

It is true that defendant presented evidence tending to show that it exercised
considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in
the bottles and by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at
several stages during the bottling process. It is well settled, however, that
when a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence
which arises upon application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the inference
has been dispelled.
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
7
Id. at 438 (“Plaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the court
that being unable to show any specific acts of negligence she relied completely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”).
8
See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) (en
banc) (“No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is cause injury.”).
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courts fully to confront the implications of such process, and
they did not like what they saw.
Part I of this article outlines the definitions of defect, in
which the seeds of the retreat from strict products liability
were planted. While the definitions of defect have been
discussed on numerous occasions, both in cases9 and in legal
literature,10 the discussion in this article will focus on the three
problem points of unknowable dangers, consumer expectation
and reasonable alternative designs. Part II discusses the
incremental erosion of strict products liability for unknowable
dangers, and the turn away from the consumer expectation
test. Part III discusses the legal climate prior to the writing of
the Third Restatement, including the advent of negligencebased defenses to strict products liability and the concomitant
breakdown in the doctrine’s conceptual framework. Part IV
analyzes the codification of a negligence standard for strict
liability as set forth by the Third Restatement. The article then
documents the subsequent judicial trend toward returning to
the pro-consumer policies of origin, arguing that the Third
Restatement, by its very rejection of strict products liability,
forced courts to confront the logical end result of their own
incremental rejection of the doctrine. Several courts, when so
confronted, have elected to reinstate strict products liability
rather than preside over its demise.
I.

THE EARLY DAYS OF DEFINING DEFECT: EASY CASES
MAKE PROBLEMATIC LAW

Once courts decided that strict products liability was a
good idea, they set about defining its scope. Everyone agreed
that manufacturers should not be liable for all injuries caused
9

See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal.
1991); Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 474-75, 477 (Cal. 1988); Barker v. Lull Eng’g
Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 384-85
(N.J. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974).
10
See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602
(1980) (discussing the problems engendered by imprecise judicial analysis of the notion
of design defect); James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in
Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1981) (concluding that judicial reliance on
hindsight by applying knowledge and attitudes prevailing at the time of trial in
assessing defect is unwarranted); Frank J. Vandall, “Design Defect” in Products
Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982)
(examining the origins of the Restatement’s definition of defect and proposing a
functional defect test).
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by their dangerous products; they should only be liable for
injuries caused by their defective products.11 Thus, dangerous
products fell into two categories: dangerous and defective
products, and dangerous and non-defective ones. Into the latter
group would fall reasonably dangerous products like knives,
ladders,
and
automobiles,
and
certain
prescription
pharmaceuticals like vaccines. Into the former would fall
unreasonably dangerous products, products that fit the
definition of defective.
The first step in developing strict products liability
doctrine was thus to define defect. Not all dangerous products
would be considered defective; strict liability was never
intended to be absolute.12 Unlike defectiveness, dangerousness
is a factual attribute. Defectiveness, on the other hand, is a
legal one. Indeed, the difference between dangerous products
and defective products resembles the difference between
factual causation and proximate causation. Factual causation
is, as its name suggests, a finding that the defendant actually
caused the plaintiff’s injury. Proximate causation, on the other
hand, represents a legal conclusion that the defendant should
be liable for the injury. Causation may be factual without being
proximate: the defendant may have caused the plaintiff’s injury

11

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d
136, 144 (4th Cir. 1992). While discussing definitions of defect with regard to the
doctrine of strict liability in tort, the court states:
What is common to all these definitions is the idea that “defect” in the strict
liability context is not synonymous with ineffectiveness or “ordinary”
malfunction; the “defect” must be one that is unreasonably unsafe for the
intended use of the product. It is the safety and dangerousness of the defect
that is the essential element of the doctrine.
Id.; McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 171 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In order for strict
products liability to apply, there must be a defect, i.e., something wrong with the
product . . . .”); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W. Va.
1979) (quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 (Wis. 1967), in which the court held
that strict liability does not mean that the manufacturer has become the insurer of its
product nor does it result in absolute liability); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986)
(“Most jurisdictions that employ the risk-utility approach require that there be
something wrong with the product before a risk-utility analysis is permitted.”).
12
The court in Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)
pointed out that:
Thus, the theory of strict liability is not a radical departure from traditional
tort concepts. Despite the use of the term “strict liability” the seller is not an
insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury
resulting from the use of his product. Proof of a defect in the product at the
time it leaves the control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller
sufficient to justify imposing liability for injuries caused by the product.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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but not be legally responsible for it.13 Similarly, while all injurycausing products are dangerous in the factual sense,
defectiveness is a legal conclusion that the manufacturer is
responsible for the injury.
In order to limit the scope of dangerous products for
which manufacturers would be liable,14 courts needed to define
defect, and reached various conclusions as to what should
constitute a defective product. The definitions uniformly
focused on the product and not on the manufacturer’s conduct.
As one court observed:
A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically the quality of the
act causing the injury; a strict products liability action focuses on the
product itself. . . . The rise of strict liability in products liability
actions results from the perception that the manufacturing
enterprise can best carry the cost of injuries occasioned by defective
products as an element of product cost.15

But courts still needed to specify what characteristics of
a dangerous product made it defective. The major tests for
defect that emerged included the imputation of knowledge
test,16 the risk-utility test,17 and the consumer expectation test.18
Sometimes the courts used one of these tests exclusively;
sometimes they used them in combination.19
Under the imputation of knowledge test, a
manufacturer would be liable for the injuries caused by a
product if a reasonable manufacturer, irrebutably presumed to
13

In the famous case of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co., [1961] App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961) (The Wagon Mound No. 1), it was
indisputable that the defendant had caused the fire by spilling oil on the surface of the
water. Without the oil, there would have been no material for the plaintiff’s workers to
ignite. The defendant was not liable to the plaintiff in this case, however, because the
oil was not the proximate cause of the damage.
14
The court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal.
1978), reflected on the necessity for defining defect.
15
Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnote
omitted).
16
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974).
17
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254-55 (Miss. 1993),
superceded by Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So. 2d 316, 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (noting
that the risk-utility test “has probably been replaced by the statutory command that
there is no liability unless the product ‘failed to perform as expected’”) (citing MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (2004)).
18
Barker, 573 P.2d at 446.
19
The Supreme Court of Oregon tied together consumer expectation and
manufacturer reasonableness in Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036-37 (“A product is defective
and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he
knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable buyer would
expect.”) (quoting Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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know of the product=s danger, would have modified the product
in some way (design or warning) before selling it.20 Those
courts that expressed allegiance to this test would not ask what
a reasonable manufacturer should have known about the
product—lack of knowledge of the danger was no defense.
Under this definition of defect, various factors such as the
utility of the product, the feasibility of altering its design to
eliminate or reduce the danger without sacrificing its utility,
and the level of danger would come into play in the course of
examining the manufacturer=s hypothetical decision-making
process. The feasibility of an alternative design is highly
relevant in determining whether the manufacturer should have
changed the design or whether the product was non-defective
as designed and sold.21 If a design change had been feasible, it
would make it more likely that the court would find the
product defective, because a reasonable manufacturer would
have changed the design before the product passed out of its
control. As becomes apparent, this test is quite close to a pure
risk-utility test, because a reasonable manufacturer necessarily
engages in a risk-utility balancing process in the design phase
of every product it makes, and this balancing process informs
any potential design modification, as well as the decision
whether to sell the product at all.22
20

Id. at 1036 (“A dangerously defective article would be one which a
reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its
harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he
sold the article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to
constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
21
For a discussion of alternative feasible designs, see Ellen Wertheimer, The
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs
in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1432-40 (1994).
22
The seven Wade-Keeton factors for evaluating the risks and utility of a
product are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product–its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product–the likelihood
that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The
availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility. (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product. (6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance.
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 n.20 (W. Va. 1979) (citing
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978)).
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Under the risk-utility test, a product is defective if its
risks outweigh its utility. In traditional and literal application,
knowledge of the danger is irrelevant: the product is examined
as it was and as it actually performed, including its dangers,
whether they were known to the manufacturer or not.23 This
test is close to the imputed knowledge test because a
reasonable manufacturer performs a risk-utility analysis on its
products before selling them, and because under neither test is
the court interested in whether the manufacturer knew of the
danger, this being tantamount to an imputation of knowledge.
As with the imputed knowledge test, the feasibility of an
alternative design is highly relevant in balancing the risks and
utility of the product in the form in which it was sold, as it may
(or may not) offer an example of a less harmful solution.
Under the consumer expectation test, the court asks
whether the product was more dangerous than a reasonable
consumer would expect. This test, like the other two, effectively
imputes knowledge of the danger to the manufacturer, because
the question is not what the manufacturer knew or should have
known about the product, but rather whether the product’s
actual danger was above reasonable consumer expectation. The
test requires an understanding of consumer expectations, but
no “understanding about the product itself.”24 Alternative
designs are perhaps less relevant here, as the focus is on what
the consumer expected of the particular product at issue.
The three tests were applied to define all defects,
whether of design or warning, depending on the test selected by
the particular jurisdiction.25 The types of defect were not
treated differently from each other: either a product was
defective, or it was not.
In practice as well as theory, the imputed knowledge
and consumer expectation tests tended to merge into the riskutility test. A reasonable manufacturer (under the imputed
knowledge test) performs a risk-utility test on all its products
before selling them. A reasonable consumer expects a product
23

See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw.
1987). Without the imputation of knowledge, there would have been no way to prove
the defendant negligent.
24
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W. 2d 727, 742 (Wis. 2001).
25
It is worth noting that a mismanufactured product is defective under all of
these tests: if a reasonable manufacturer had known of the flaw, that manufacturer
would have fixed it before selling the product; a flawed product fails any risk-utility
test; and a reasonable consumer does not, as a matter of law, expect a flawed product.
Res ipsa loquitur is basically a shortcut to these conclusions.
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to be one that a reasonable manufacturer would sell.26 Many
courts simply held that the consumer expectation test included
the risk-utility test, or abandoned the consumer expectation
test altogether.27 Whether courts applied a risk-utility test, one
of the other tests, or a combination, the results proved to be
controversial in design and warning cases, particularly in
situations where the product involved an unknowable danger
or could not be made safer by a change in design.
II.

THE EPIC BATTLES WITH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
BEFORE THE THIRD RESTATEMENT

A.

The Demise of Liability for Unknowable Dangers in
Failure to Warn Cases

The original tests for defect did not deal explicitly with
the problem presented by liability for dangers that were
unknowable at the time the product was manufactured.28 By
the time the issue arose, the courts had set up their tests for
defective products. The cases in which the tests for defect were
adopted did not involve unknowable dangers. For example,
Phillips v. Kimwood, the leading case expounding the imputed
knowledge test, concerned an industrial sanding machine that
presented the risk of regurgitating sheets of plywood back at
the person using the machine.29 The installation of a set of rearfacing teeth, an easy and straightforward design change, would
have eliminated this danger. While the court used the case as a
vehicle for adopting the imputed knowledge test for defect, the
26

In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Or. 1974) the court
pointed out that this is
because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a
reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing. That is to say, a
manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product,
considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell
below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.
Id.
27
See discussion infra Part II.B.
28
For the purposes of this article, there is no difference among the time of
design, manufacture, or sale. See Henderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 963-68. What is
important is that the manufacturer did not know of the danger before it materialized.
29
The details of the accident were as follows:
The pressure exerted by the pinch rolls in the top half of the machine was
insufficient to counteract the pressure which the sanding belts were exerting
upon the thin sheet of fiberboard and, as a result, the machine regurgitated
the piece of fiberboard back at plaintiff, hitting him in the abdomen and
causing him the injuries for which he now seeks compensation.
Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1035.
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plaintiff could, in all likelihood, have alternatively established
negligence in design.30 The danger was clearly knowable, and
the manufacturer arguably was unreasonable for failing to
protect against it. Similarly, Barker v. Lull Engineering, a
leading case adopting a combination of consumer expectation
and risk-utility tests, involved a piece of construction
equipment that lacked a roll-over shield that would protect the
operator of the equipment in the event of an accident.31 As with
Phillips, such a design change was both readily available and
straightforward, and the manufacturer was arguably negligent
in designing the product. The plaintiff could have won a
negligent design case and did not need strict products liability
in order to prevail.
Thus, courts were unprepared for the problem that
would be presented by lawsuits claiming that a product was
defective because the manufacturer had failed to warn of a
danger that was unknowable to the manufacturer. As Phillips
and Barker demonstrate, the early § 402A cases involved
eminently knowable dangers, dangers that could be eliminated
or reduced. The tests for defect adopted in these decisions did
not differentiate between types of defect or knowable or
unknowable dangers. This cannot have been accidental:
potential knowledge of the danger was completely irrelevant to
the policy that mandated recovery for innocent plaintiffs, even
when recovery was sought from innocent defendants. Indeed,
strict products liability was designed specifically to deal with
cases where the manufacturer had not been negligent. When
actually confronted with unknowable dangers, however, the
courts showed a tendency to back down from the principles and
law of strict products liability. As Professor Owen has
observed: “[i]n recent years, while an occasional court still
clings to the notion that strict liability for defective design and
warnings should not depend upon the foreseeability of the risk,
most courts squarely confronting the issue have shielded
30

Id. at 1038-39:
It is our opinion that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that a
reasonably prudent manufacturer, knowing that the machine would be fed
manually and having the constructive knowledge of its propensity to
regurgitate thin sheets when it was set for thick ones, which the courts via
strict liability have imposed upon it, would have warned plaintiff’s employer .
. . and that, in the absence of such a warning, the machine was dangerously
defective.
Id.
31

Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 1978).
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manufacturers from liability for harm caused by unforeseeable
product risks.”32
The issue that caused the massive retreat33 from strict
products liability centered around whether manufacturers
should be liable for injuries caused by dangers that had been
unknowable at the time of manufacture. While in theory there
are design dangers that may have been unknowable at the time
of manufacture,34 the cases tended to be about failure to warn,
and inevitably focused on whether a manufacturer should be
liable for failing to warn of a danger about which the
manufacturer could not have known.35 With one notable
exception, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,36 which
involved asbestos, most of the initial cases dealt with
prescription pharmaceuticals.37 In response to what was
32

David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 288

(1998).
33

Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and
Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 851-64 (2003) (thoroughly documenting the retreat);
see also Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1206-69 (1992)
[hereinafter Empire].
34
It is difficult to imagine a design defect that would have been unknowable
in the face of expert testing. In most design cases, the plaintiff could prevail even if
required to prove negligence, because the failure to uncover the design problem might
itself prove inadequate product testing. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
439 (Cal. 1944) makes this clear:
If the explosion resulted from a defective bottle containing a safe pressure,
the defendant would be liable if it negligently failed to discover such flaw. If
the defect were visible, an inference of negligence would arise from the failure
of defendant to discover it. Where defects are discoverable, it may be assumed
that they will not ordinarily escape detection if a reasonable inspection is
made, and if such a defect is overlooked an inference arises that a proper
inspection was not made.
Id.
35
Clearly, if the danger were knowable, or if the manufacturer failed
adequately to test the product, the manufacturer would be liable in negligence.
36
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982).
37
Because they involved prescription pharmaceuticals, many of these cases
extensively discussed comment k of § 402A, which addressed application of products
liability principles to pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith, Kline &
French Labs., 447 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. 1984) (stating that comment k “provides for
drugs and vaccines an exception to the strict liability defined in 402A.”); Brown v.
Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95,
97 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 417 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “[t]he scope of the
warning is the key factor in a drug products liability suit because prescription drugs
are ‘unavoidably unsafe products.’”); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah
1991) (upheld a blanket exemption for prescription drugs but refused to rely
exclusively on the plain language of comment k); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d
59, 63 (Wash. 1996) (holding that comment k extends a blanket exemption to
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers). For further discussion of comment k, see infra
text accompanying notes 59-70.
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perceived as the unfairness of holding manufacturers liable for
failing to warn of dangers about which they could not have
known, courts almost uniformly, and sometimes with unseemly
haste,38 backed down from all of the tests for defect that they
had carefully developed over the preceding years, and imposed
a knowability requirement. When confronted specifically with
the prospect of imposing liability on pharmaceutical companies,
courts justified their retreat by reasoning that the development
of socially beneficial prescription pharmaceuticals should be
encouraged and that strict liability would inhibit their
development.39 This justification, however, did not adequately
explain the judicial haste in retreating from strict liability, nor
the breadth of the decisions, which went well beyond
pharmaceutical cases.40
The process of this decline—although more like a rout—
is readily documented.41 In Beshada, an asbestos case, the court
reacted almost with surprise to the defendants’ suggestion that
they should not be held liable for failing to warn of the
unknowable dangers of asbestos.42 The court pointed out that
strict products liability differed from negligence-based liability
precisely because it imputed knowledge of the danger to the
manufacturer.43 Allowing the defendant to use lack of
knowability as a defense would undercut the imputation of
knowledge test and replace it with the negligence standard
that § 402A was designed to supplement, thereby rendering §
402A meaningless.
The Beshada court noted that it was not asking
manufacturers to do the impossible in holding them liable for

38

See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984). In Feldman,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, a scant 23 months after deciding Beshada, ruled that
imputed knowledge would be restricted to “knowledge at the time the manufacturer
distributed the product.” Id.
39
See Brown, 751 P.2d. at 477 (strict products liability not applicable to
prescription pharmaceuticals because of special concerns related to that industry).
40
See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556-57
(Cal. 1991) (Brown not intended only to apply to prescription pharmaceuticals).
41
See Empire, supra note 33.
42
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) (“If
we accepted defendants’ argument, we would create a distinction among fact situations
that defies common sense.”).
43
Id. at 545 (The “difference between negligence and strict liability in
warning cases . . . [is that] when a plaintiff sues under strict liability, there is no need
to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of any dangerous
propensities of its product—such knowledge is imputed to the manufacturer.” (quoting
Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1981))).
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failing to warn of all dangers whether knowable or not.44 It is of
course impossible to warn of an unknowable danger.
Impossibility, however, is not the issue: responsibility for the
product, and for the injuries it has caused, is.45 The basis for
liability is not negligence, under which doctrine a
manufacturer would be liable only for dangers about which the
manufacturer should have known, but rather strict liability,
under which doctrine the basis for liability is defectiveness.
Under strict products liability, liability for a product follows
from responsibility for producing that product, and not from
negligence in producing it. The manufacturer may not have
known of the danger, but the plaintiff did not know of it
either.46 The manufacturer designed, packaged, and sold the
product, and should accept responsibility for the injuries it
causes provided the product fails the applicable test for defect.
The policy of strict products liability allocates the costs of
defective products to the manufacturer, not the plaintiff.
“‘[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products . . . be placed on those who market them,
and be treated as a cost of production’ against which liability
insurance can be obtained.”47
Perhaps the fact that Beshada was an asbestos case
made it easier for the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs,
because the public interest arguments that would later emerge
in prescription pharmaceutical cases were absent. Less than
two years later, however, in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., the
Supreme Court of New Jersey backed down from this
doctrinally pure position and allowed unknowability as a
defense in a case involving a prescription pharmaceutical.48 One
might argue that Beshada itself was a product of the “easy
cases make problematic law” proposition, and it is clear that
the court was much more comfortable holding asbestos
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers
44

Id. at 546 (“When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a
duty on them to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect
of strict liability. By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendant to have
done something that is impossible.”).
45
See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (“As a
policy matter, strict liability in products cases deals with enterprise responsibility.”).
46
See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 754-55 (Wis.
2001) (manufacturer liable for unknowable danger; consumer did not know of the
danger, and the consumer expectation test applied).
47
Id. at 750 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. c (1965)).
48
479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984).

2/22/2005 7:18:58 PM

2005]

THE BITER BIT

903

than it was holding drug manufacturers liable in the same kind
of case. Be that as it may, the court in Feldman seemed
horrified at the prospect of holding a manufacturer liable for
failing to warn of an unknowable danger. Although the court
denied that it was overruling Beshada,49 it is clear that
Feldman did exactly that, stating that “[i]f Beshada were
deemed to hold generally or in all cases . . . that in a warning
context knowledge of the unknowable is irrelevant in
determining the applicability of strict liability, we would not
agree.”50 Feldman allowed manufacturers to argue that they
should not be liable for failing to warn of an unknowable
danger.51 As one court pointed out following Feldman:
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d does not require that
the plaintiff prove the manufacturer knew or should have known
that the product was unreasonably dangerous. However, courts have
refused to hold defendants strictly liable in the absence of such
knowledge or reason to know. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (1982), 90 N.J. 191;
447 A. 2d 539, that a manufacturer could be strictly liable for harm
caused by a product even when it could not have known of the
danger at the time of manufacture. This case has not generally been
followed. Courts instead include foreseeability in their analysis of
strict liability.52

Instead of pursuing a case-by-case approach to the riskutility test, courts discarded the imputation of knowledge
approach altogether in the only category of cases where it
would determine the result: those in which the plaintiff could
not prove that the danger was knowable. As one commentator
put it:
[D]espite their bold rhetoric, courts are seldom willing to apply the
imputed knowledge approach in those rare cases where it actually
makes a difference. Rather, the tendency is to emphasize that
imputed knowledge differentiates strict liability from negligence only

49

Id. at 388 (“We do not overrule Beshada, but restrict Beshada to the
circumstances giving rise to its holding.”).
50
Id. at 387.
51
All that was left of strict products liability for failure to warn after
Feldman got through with it was the placement of the burden of showing
unknowability on the defendant. The plaintiff did not have to prove that the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger; rather, the defendant had to
prove that the danger was unknowable. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388.
52
Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183-84 n.1 (Ohio 1990).
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in those cases in which the defendant likely knew or should have
known of the risk even without imputed knowledge.53

Courts used several techniques in the incremental
process of whittling away at strict liability for unknowable
dangers. The first was simply to do so outright, the route taken
by the Feldman court. Another was the foot in the door
technique. In Brown v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of
California ruled that manufacturers of prescription
pharmaceuticals should not be liable for failing to warn of
unknowable dangers because of the damage the threat of such
liability would do to the public interest in the development of
new prescription drugs.54 The opinion, although carefully
crafted to focus exclusively on the prescription drug industry,
was extended to asbestos litigation in subsequent cases. In
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,55 the court ruled
that asbestos manufacturers should not be liable for failing to
warn of unknowable dangers. Ignoring the difference between
pharmaceuticals and asbestos, the Anderson court based its
decision on the highly dubious ground that Brown was not
confined to prescription pharmaceuticals.56 Other courts used
similar arguments and tenuous analogies to avoid holding
manufacturers liable for unknown dangers.57
Yet another technique involved what I have called the
fox versus fox terrier approach.58 This technique relied on
53

Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 896 (2002).
54
751 P.2d 470, 478-80 (Cal. 1988).
55
810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991). A prescription pharmaceutical might pass a riskutility test, even without a warning. Asbestos certainly does not.
56
Id. at 556-59.
57
Other courts have extended protection from liability for unknowable
dangers beyond the field of prescription drugs. See, e.g., Transue v. Aesthetech Corp.,
341 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (breast implants); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d
1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a pace maker can fall under comment k
protection); Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 378 (Ct. App. 1992) (extending
Brown to implanted medical devices); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 397 (N.J.
1974) (holding that hepatitis-infected blood should be considered an “unavoidably
unsafe product” as defined in comment k), aff’d, 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975); RuizGuzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795 (Wash. 2000) (blanket protection for all
medical products, but protection will be extended on a case-by-case basis for
pesticides); Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Wash. 1991) (extending
comment k immunity to all blood and blood product cases); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co.,
577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978) (extending comment k protection to include the Dalkon
Shield, an internal contraceptive device); see also Hines v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 527 P.2d
1075, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (implying extension of Restatement § 402A comment k
protection to blood and, more specifically, blood infected with hepatitis).
58
This label is based on an essay by Stephen Jay Gould called “The Case of
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comment j to § 402A, which many courts, quoting an edited
version of this comment from other opinions in other
jurisdictions, misinterpreted to allow liability only for failing to
warn of knowable dangers. In applying this technique, a court
would quote comment j to § 402A in support of the position that
manufacturers should not be liable for failing to warn of
unknowable dangers. As quoted by the courts,59 comment j
provides:
Where, however, the product * * * is one whose danger is not
generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would
reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to
give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of

the Creeping Fox Terrier Clone,” in which he discussed the problem presented when
sequential sources simply quote from the preceding source, errors and all. The essay
deals with an error about the size of eohippus that appeared in an early biology text;
the error reappears through decades of texts because the subsequent authors all quote,
in sequence, the error as quoted in the preceding text. Comment j to § 402A has been
treated much as the evolutionary history of horses was treated in these texts. See
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY
155, 155-67 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991).
59
Numerous courts have quoted comment j in this manner. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986); Vermeulen v. Armstrong
World Indus., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1204 (Ct. App. 1988); Malin v. Union Carbide
Corp., 530 A.2d 794, 798 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450
S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1994) (utilizing quotation marks, the judge in this seatbelt failure case
quotes comment j in a way so that he eliminates the ellipses and takes comment j
completely out of the allergy context). Other courts picked up this version of comment j
in their own opinions, citing preceding opinions as the source. This process may be
traced as one follows an identical version from Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 507 S.E.2d 182,
184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 461 S.E.2d 877, 898
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (stating “see also Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j
(seller is required to give warning ‘if he has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge’ of the danger
. . . .”)) into subsequent opinions, in which the identical quotation appeared. See
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.,402 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ill. 1980); Hickman v. Thomas C.
Thompson Co., 644 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (D. Colo. 1986). This case involved the
inhalation of enamel dust:
This argument is supported by comment j to § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965), which states, in applicable part, that “the seller is
required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of
the presence of the ingredient and the danger.”
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965)). In McElhaney v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D. S.D. 1983) the court quoted comment j as
follows:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the
seller may be required to give directions or warning . . . as to its use. . . . [T]he
seller is required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by the
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge, of the presence of . . . the danger.
Id.; Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386) (N.J. 1984); Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998).
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reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge, of the * * * danger.

Unfortunately for the intellectual integrity of this
analysis, however, comment j in fact says more.60 Comment j,
without the careful ellipses, provides:
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a
substantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient
is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the
seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or
by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger.61

Comment j requires the seller to warn against
ingredients that might provoke allergic reactions. As the
antecedent of the word “it” in the fifth line of the above
quotation is “ingredient,” not “danger,” the risk involved is the
risk of an allergic reaction, not a general danger attached to
use of the product.62 It seems, then, that the courts simply
quoted comment j as quoted by each other, without reading the
actual text of the comment. When one reads the actual text,
one discovers that the comment is about allergic reactions and
only about knowability insofar as an ingredient is known to

60

As the court pointed out in Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142
(Mont. 1997):
Furthermore, the Chemical Companies rely on only one part of the third
sentence of Comment j which, when considered in its entirety, indicated that
this sentence is not applicable to the question certified to this Court. . . . The
certified question before us involves an alleged cancer-causing ingredient, not
one to which the decedent is alleged to have been allergic. Therefore, the
third sentence of Comment j is not applicable to the certified question.
Id.
61
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
62
The court noted the major flaw in the defendant’s argument that comment
j provided immunity for unknowable dangers in In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F.
Supp. 1454, 1458-59 & n.4 (D. Haw. 1986):
Defendants believe that Hawaii will follow comment j, and that comment j
allows the defense. I do not believe that the Court will follow comment j with
the result that it overrides the consumer expectation test when the
defendants could not have known of the products defects . . . . But the largest
flaw in defendants’ argument is that comment j applies to products that
cause allergic reactions. Comment j applies to common products, such as
strawberries, eggs, and possibly cosmetics, that are otherwise safe yet cause
allergic reactions. Obviously no one would consider asbestosis, lung cancer, or
mesothelioma resulting from asbestos exposure an allergic reaction.
Id. at 1458-59.
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cause such an allergic reaction. Quite simply, the comment
does not support the use to which the courts have put it.63
Courts have employed a similar technique in using
comment k to justify exempting pharmaceutical manufacturers
from § 402A. Many happily held that comment k provided an
exemption from the strictures of § 402A for prescription drugs
because such drugs are unavoidably dangerous.64 Unfortunately
for the intellectual integrity of such judicial analysis, comment
k does not say this. Comment k, which again is almost never
quoted in its entirety, provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably
leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or
experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.65

63

Even when they quote comment j in its entirety, however, some courts
persist in citing comment j as proof that the manufacturer is only liable for knowable
dangers. This knowability requirement, along with comment j, was then applied to
cases that had nothing to do with allergies or even pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Crislip v.
TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ohio 1990) (wood-burning furnace). In
Crislip, while discussing failure to warn issues, the court cited comment j as supporting
the general proposition that a manufacturer can only be held liable for failing to warn
if the danger was knowable. Id. Although the court includes virtually all of the
language of comment j, it italicizes the warning language for emphasis and completely
ignores the language regarding allergies. Id.
64
See supra text accompanying note 37.
65
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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This language does not include an exemption from §
402A for prescription pharmaceuticals. Far from it. Comment k
provides no immunities at all. Rather, comment k by its own
terms
provides
that
manufacturers
of
prescription
pharmaceuticals are not strictly liable for damages provided
their drug passes a risk-utility test. The example provided in
the comment itself is the Pasteur vaccine, which, although
dangerous, is not defective as the disease that it is designed to
prevent is hideously fatal. The Pasteur vaccine is dangerous,
but not unreasonably so. Indeed, comment k invites the
application of the risk-utility test to drugs; if the drug passes it,
the drug is dangerous but not defective; if not, the drug is
defective. It is also worth pointing out that a drug like the
Pasteur vaccine would be nondefective even in the absence of
any warning, because no consumer would reject the vaccine in
spite of being warned.66 Comment k recognizes the existence of
reasonably dangerous products. In order to be so classified,
however, the product must pass a risk-utility test.
Some courts simply ruled that there was no difference
between failure to warn in negligence and failure to warn
under § 402A.67 In doing so, these courts simply and explicitly
abolished strict liability for failure to warn altogether.
Manufacturers would only be liable for failing to warn under
negligence doctrine. One court remarked: “After reviewing the
authorities and comments on the failure to warn question, we
believe any posited distinction between strict liability and
negligence principles is illusory. We fail to see any distinction
between negligence and strict liability in the analysis of those

66

See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting
the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine compared with risk of contracting polio
without it).
67
Some jurisdictions required that manufacturers prove lack of knowability,
while others simply divided failure to warn law from strict products liability and put it
back into negligence.
The following are cases that require proof of lack of knowability: Oglesby v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402
N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984);
Mauch v. Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346 (N.D. 1984); Bragg v. HiRanger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (S.C. 1995).
The following cases stand for the concept that the standard in strict
liability is a negligence standard: Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 466 (7th
Cir. 1984); Crislip, 556 N.E.2d at 1183 (“Thus, the standard imposed upon the
defendant in a strict liability claim grounded upon an inadequate warning is the same
as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon inadequate warning.”); Standhardt v.
Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283, 1290-91 (N.M. 1973); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
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jurisdictions injecting a knowledge requirement into their strict
liability/ failure to warn equation.”68
B.

The Consumer Expectation Test

Like the imputed knowledge test, the consumer
expectation test has nothing to do with a manufacturer’s
knowledge of the danger. Rather, the test concerns whether the
product performed as safely (or as unsafely) as a reasonable
consumer would expect.
As has often been documented,69 the consumer
expectation test ran into problems from the start. As an initial
matter, there may be no ascertainable consumer expectation
for a particular product.70 Consumer expectation for a product
may be too low, as is the case for products with obvious
dangers.71 Conversely, consumer expectation for a product may
be too high, as might be the case for prescription
pharmaceuticals.72
68

Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994). Not all courts
abandoned the imputation of knowledge in such cases. Hawaii, for example, continued
to impute knowledge irrespective of its knowability. See Johnson v. RaybestosManhattan Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987). Massachusetts, which initially
adhered to the imputation of knowledge, only abandoned its commitment to strict
products liability in 1998, in Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 92223 (Mass. 1998), after other courts were returning to the Second Restatement.
69
See, e.g., Empire, supra note 33, at 1198.
70
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1967). See also Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1221 n.16 (Alaska 1998) (The Supreme
Court of Alaska, discussing the possible shortcomings of the consumer expectations
test and citing Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 306 (Cal. 1994), stated “Soule
did recognize, however, that some products may be so unfamiliar to the average
consumer that it would be difficult to form any intelligent expectations about how they
should perform.”).
71
If the consumer expectation test governed, no product with an obvious
danger could be defective. Courts have uniformly rejected this argument, holding that
products with obvious dangers, while they passed a consumer expectation test, might
still fail a risk-utility test. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, 1987 WL
6486, at *35-36 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987) (punch press).
72
A reasonable consumer might expect a vaccine to be without risks when it
cannot be so and should not be ruled defective simply because it is dangerous. Such a
product might pass a risk-utility test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. k (1965); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974):
Although the living virus in the vaccine does not make the vaccine defective,
it does make it what the Restatement calls an “unavoidably unsafe product”,
one which cannot be made “safe” no matter how carefully it is manufactured.
Such products are not necessarily “unreasonably dangerous”, for as this
Court has long recognized in wrestling with product liability questions, many
goods possess both utility and danger. . . . Applying this standard here, the
scales must tip in favor of availability. The evil to be prevented–poliomyelitis
and its accompanying paralysis–is great. Although the danger that vaccinees
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Many courts dodged the problems presented by the
consumer expectation test by abolishing it or reconstruing it as
a risk-utility test.73 Thus, as the Phillips court declared,74 the
reasonable consumer would be held to expect the product that a
reasonable manufacturer would produce. Otherwise, the
reasonable consumer would perform an increasingly
hypothetical risk-utility balancing test on the product—the
same test the manufacturer would perform. The pure
reasonable consumer test fell into desuetude in the same caseby-case process that led to the abolition of liability for
unknowable dangers.
The shift away from the consumer expectation test was
initially motivated by the need for a standard that would
protect consumers from products that passed the consumer
expectation test because they were obviously dangerous. This is
clear in Barker v. Lull Engineering and ensuing cases: courts
perceived a need for a standard of defectiveness that would
leave room for a design to be defective even if the product were
no more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would expect.75
may contract polio is qualitatively devastating, it is statistically miniscule.
On balance then, marketing the vaccine is justified despite the danger.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
73
Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25, 27 (Ala. 1998) (concluding
that the appropriate standard in a crashworthiness case was a test that, although
referred to as a consumer expectation test, was a hybrid test including risk-utility
factors and the requirement of proof of a reasonable alternative design). The Justices in
Flemister stated:
“Consumer expectation,” considered in the context of the entire text of [the
relevant jury instruction], is not the exclusive test by which a jury evaluates
an alleged design defect. Rather, the term “consumer expectation” . . . states
only one factor of a standard that acknowledges a consumer’s reasonable
expectations as to the intended purpose of the automobile; [applicable law]
also requires proof of the attendant risk and utility of the automobile’s design
and of any available design alternatives, from which proof a jury could
reasonably conclude that the automobile’s design was defective.
723 So. 2d at 27; see also Miele v. Am. Tobacco Co., 770 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (App. Div.
2003):
While the dissent herein suggests that New York applies a consumer
expectations test to design defect causes of action, the Court of Appeals made
clear in Denny v. Ford Motor Co. (87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639
N.Y.S.2d 250), that the determination of whether a design defect is actionable
requires a balancing of risks and utilities of the product, with the consumer’s
degree of awareness of the product’s potential danger but one factor to
consider in that analysis.
Id.
74
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974).
75
Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (“[A] product may
be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if
through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s design embodies ‘excessive
preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger

2/22/2005 7:18:58 PM

2005]

THE BITER BIT

911

Numerous California decisions have implicitly recognized this fact
and have made clear, through varying linguistic formulations, that a
product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary
consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines
that the product’s design embodies “excessive preventable danger,”
or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent
in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.76

In other cases, consumer expectation tests were either
rejected or transformed into a risk-utility test in order to allow
complex products, about which consumers could have no
reasonable expectation, to be ruled defective.77 Thus, necessary
refinements in the consumer expectation test were made in
order to allow liability in a broader group of cases than the test,
literally applied, would have permitted.78
All of this led to the consumer expectation test becoming
increasingly disfavored. Some courts abandoned it altogether in
favor of a risk-utility test.79 Of course, this abandonment does
inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.”); CollazoSantiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F. Supp. 134, 137-39 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that
Puerto Rico would adopt the two-prong Barker test which would allow a jury to find a
product defective even if the product meets an ordinary consumer’s expectations);
Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979) (adopting the Barker twoprong test, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated “[i]n view of the diversity of product
deficiencies which could fall within the notion of defect, we are persuaded that the
Barker two-prong test provides the most comprehensive guidelines for instructing
juries, without compromising any of the goals of strict liability.”); Ontai v. Straub
Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983) (holding that the Barker test would
be applied in the jurisdiction of Hawaii).
76
Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
77
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that the
consumer expectation test applies in cases where the consumer could have formed an
expectation. “Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate [because the
consumer has none], the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition
may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors . . . .”). But see Clay v. Ford
Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that although Ohio statute
previously provided for both the risk-utility test and the consumer expectation test, an
amendment to the statute in 1998 eliminated the consumer expectation test from
consideration in products designed after January 27, 1997).
78
That group of cases in which consumer expectations were unrealistically
high did not play a major role in the changing of the test for defectiveness. Most of
those cases involved prescription pharmaceuticals, and courts tended to deal with drug
manufacturers under warning, not design, law. Comment k provides an example of
such a product in the form of the Pasteur rabies vaccine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965), as does Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)
(polio vaccine).
79
See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating
that “the fact finder can only determine whether design was defective after hearing
evidence about what designs were feasible the time the product was manufactured and
whether they were in fact safer.”); Beck, 593 P.2d at 885 (stating that once plaintiff has
shown that the injury was proximately caused by the product, defendant can avoid
liability by proving that the benefits of the design outweighed the risk of danger);
Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58 (defining defect through a combination of consumer
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not in itself eliminate liability for unknowable dangers,
because the risk-utility test, like imputed knowledge and
consumer expectation, has nothing to do with knowability.
Rather, the risk-utility test involves weighing the product as it
was, and no party’s knowledge of the danger—whether plaintiff
or defendant—is relevant to this process.
C.

Reasonable Alternative Design

Section 402A did not require that the plaintiff prove the
existence of a reasonable alternative design as an element of
defectiveness. To be sure, many courts were reluctant to rule
that a design could be defective without proof that it could be
made safer,80 but not all held that a reasonable alternative
design was a sine qua non of design defect under § 402A.81 Some
commentators, however, took the position that liability in the
absence of an alternative feasible design, (which they called
“product category liability”), was tantamount to liability
without defect.82 This characterization is inaccurate and
theoretically unsound. Liability in the absence of an alternative
feasible design is liability without defect if and only if defect is
defined as requiring an alternative feasible design. If defect is
defined in terms of a risk-utility test, the existence of an
alternative feasible design may be a factor in weighing the
product’s usefulness and dangers, but is not a requirement for
engaging in the weighing process.83 A product must pass a riskexpectation test and risk-utility balancing analysis).
80
Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
existence of a safer alternative design is a sine qua non for the imposition of liability. . .
. It is illogical to say that a product is defective . . . when ‘defect’ has historically been
measured in reference to the availability, or at least the feasibility of safer
alternatives.”), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (for further consideration in light of
Cipollone), aff’d on reh’g, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Miller v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting summary judgment where
plaintiff failed to allege that cigarettes were capable of being safely designed), aff’d,
856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985)
(declining to impose strict liability under doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity
upon manufacturer and marketer of a handgun and holding that the risk-utility strict
liability test was inapplicable).
81
Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986) (The
availability of a reasonable alternative design is “not a necessary element of a
plaintiff’s burden” in a design defect action.).
82
These commentators include Professors Henderson and Twerski, who were
the Reporters for the Third Restatement. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991).
83
As one court stated:
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utility test in order to be nondefective; it can pass (or fail) such
a test whether there is or is not an alternative feasible design.
An unavoidably unsafe product, even one bearing a warning,
can still be tested under a risk-utility standard.84 Holding such
a product nondefective solely because it is unavoidably unsafe
is illogical, as the risks may still outweigh the benefits of the
unavoidably unsafe product. Useful, unavoidably unsafe
products may well be nondefective; useless ones should not be
exempt from defective status simply because they cannot be
made safer.85 Be this as it may, courts tended to allow
themselves to be persuaded that liability in the absence of an
alternative feasible design was liability without defect,86 even
Defendants argue that in order to recover, Plaintiffs should have been
required to prove there was a safer alternative design; there is no such
requirement under Michigan law. The existence of, or lack of a safer
alternative design, may have been relevant, but it is not dispositive in the
sense that such proof is necessary to make out a prima facie case or in the
sense that the court should have decided the issue as a matter of law. The
trial court correctly instructed that there may be more than one proximate
cause and that defendants’ conduct need only be a proximate cause in order
for plaintiffs to recover.
Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., No. 5223, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13923, at *36 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 30, 1980) (citing Anderson, Admr. v. Volkswagenwerk & Traverse
Motors, Inc., Case No. 31230); see also Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F. Supp. 1475,
1479 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (Although the Georgia Supreme Court refers to proof of the
existence of an alternative design in design defect cases as the “heart of a design defect
analysis,” alternative designs are only one factor in the analysis.); Pease v. Am.
Cyanamid, 795 F. Supp. 755, 759 (D. Md. 1992) (proof of an alternative design is one of
seven factors to be weighed in the balancing test to determine if a product can be
considered unreasonably dangerous); Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 15253 (Mo. 1998) (declining to incorporate into the jury instructions the Third
Restatement’s requirement of a reasonable alternative design).
84
Some products are unavoidably unsafe, and can be rendered non-defective
by the addition of a warning. The mere presence of a warning, however, should not
automatically mean that the product passes a risk-utility test, particularly where the
warning provides information that does not render the product safe, but which rather
informs the consumer about dangers that inhere in the normal use of the product. See
Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
85
Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in their Eyes, Product Category
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1435 (1994).
86
See Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.
Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that
cigarettes were incapable of being designed safely precluded a design defect charge);
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (declining to impose strict liability
under the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity upon manufacturer and marketer
of a handgun and holding that the risk-utility strict liability test was inapplicable). For
more recent cases, see Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.
2002); Lederman v. Pac. Indus., 119 F.3d 551, 555 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997); Bravman v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 794 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 144 (4th Cir. 1992).
But see Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
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though this meant exempting manufacturers of highly
dangerous/low utility products from liability.
As is the case with unknowable dangers, the idea of a
reasonable alternative design has implications for the
consumer expectation test for defect. If the consumer
expectation test is used, the court simply asks whether the
product was as safe as a reasonable consumer would expect.
This question has nothing to do with either knowability of the
danger or availability of an alternative feasible design: the
question is simply whether the product was as safe as expected
by the consumer. Thus, neither unknowability nor lack of a
reasonable alternative design should constitute a defense for
the manufacturer under the consumer expectation test. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the Third Restatement
does not include a consumer expectation test for design or
warning defect.87

Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1407, 1428 (1994) (“The centerpiece of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability is the requirement that the plaintiff present evidence of a reasonable
alternative design as part of her prima facie case. This requirement is not supported by
the majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the question.”).
Efforts to foreclose liability in the absence of an alternative feasible design
have not been restricted to the courts. Legislatures have enacted statutes defining
products liability to exclude liability in the absence of such a design. See Brown v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520-24 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussing the
application of one such statute as applied to cigarettes). The New Jersey Product
Liability Act foreclosed liability both in the absence of an alternative feasible design
and in the presence of consumer expectation of the danger. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C3a (West 2000). Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes to protect manufacturers of
guns and ammunition, as well as cigarettes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-11 (2001).
Significantly, North Carolina’s statute was enacted in 1987, the period when strict
products liability was being curtailed nationally. Id.
87
Mismanufactured products almost by definition fail a consumer
expectation test, and the Third Restatement has left the law applicable to such
products alone. Res ipsa loquitur applies to mismanufactured products, and not to any
other type of defect. This leads to the fascinating problem of classifying products as
defective by reason of mismanufacture or design; as Professor Twerski himself has
implied, one cannot always tell from what type of defect a product suffers. See Alvin S.
Weinstein, Aaron D. Twerski, Henry R. Piehler & William A. Donaher, Product
Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 430-31 (1974)
(product might be defective in either design or manufacture, or neither, because “all
products are flawed at some technological level”). The implications of the classification
are potentially vast; however, the plaintiff must prove an alternative feasible design if
the claim is one of design defect, but need only prove that the product caused the injury
and that it should not have done so if the claim is one of mismanufacture. See, e.g.,
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 869-70 (1998).
[B]oth legal commentators and the practicing bar muddied the waters by
confusing the issue of the standard for design defect with other issues that
have little or nothing directly to do with the standard, such as the issue of
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This article now sets the stage for the Third
Restatement of Products Liability. It turns to the eve of the
Third Restatement, and analyzes where the legal permutations
of § 402A discussed above had landed the law as the Third
Restatement drafting process began.
D.

The Eve of the Third Restatement: The Special Problem
of Unknowable Dangers

The decimation of strict products liability was greeted
with enthusiasm by many scholars, including Professors
Henderson and Twerski, the Reporters for the Third
Restatement, who had been opposed to liability without fault
from the start.88 These eminent scholars were appointed to be
the reporters for the Third Restatement of Torts, and they
enthusiastically embraced what they viewed as a judicial trend
towards reshaping strict products liability into negligencebased liability.89
It is worth noting that the courts that abolished the
imputation of knowledge in cases involving unknowable
dangers focused exclusively on the perceived unfairness to the
defendants of holding them liable for failing to do something
they could not, by definition, have done. In their zeal to protect
manufacturing endeavors, the courts ignored or glossed over
the unfairness to the plaintiffs in leaving them with costs they
could not, also by definition, have avoided.90 Strict products
liability stands for the idea that the party that designed, sold,
marketed and profited from the product should pay for the
injuries it causes as a cost of doing business.91 However unfair
whether the producer should be liable when a design conforms with the best
technology available at the time of sale.
Id. at 871.
88
For an extensive listing of articles written by Professors Henderson and
Twerski, see Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles’ Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265 n.3 (1994).
89
Not everyone agreed that there was any such trend. John Vargo presented
strong evidence to the contrary in his monumental article. John F. Vargo, The
Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996). Vargo claims that the reporters of the Third
Restatement overstated the strength of the precedents on which they relied.
90
One of the original policy reasons driving the imposition of strict liability
was that it “insure[d] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
91
See Mark. C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY,
AND TORT REFORM 73-74 (1995).
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it may appear to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to warn
of an unknowable danger, it is surely more unfair to leave the
costs of the injury on the plaintiff. Allowing manufacturers to
escape liability imposes a subsidy of their manufacturing
efforts on whatever entity gets left with the costs. This result is
indefensible both morally and economically.
The Third Restatement, by codifying this subsidy, also
brought it judicial attention. As the following analysis will
demonstrate, however, proponents of eliminating strict
products liability would probably have been better off leaving
their views uncodified.
As previously discussed, the basis for the fairly
wholesale retreat from imposing liability for unknowable
dangers lay in the idea that liability for failing to warn of
unknowable dangers would be absolute. If the test is whether a
manufacturer acted reasonably in not warning of knowable
dangers, defenses are few and far between, because what
factfinder would conclude that a reasonable manufacturer,
knowing of the danger, would fail to warn about it? The courts
could see no defenses that would protect the manufacturer
from liability in such a scenario, and thus began the retreat
from strict products liability.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s highly disingenuous
opinion in Feldman exemplifies the dismay of the courts when
confronted with the fruition of their adoption of strict products
liability, and the possibility that a manufacturer might have no
defenses when charged with failing to warn of an unknowable
danger. In design cases, the manufacturer can argue with at
least a chance of success that the product, dangers aside,
passes a risk-utility test. This is the case when a product has a
high utility and cannot be made safe. The idea that there are
reasonably dangerous products comes as a corollary to the idea
that some products are unreasonably dangerous. Any product
that is dangerous, but whose utility outweighs its dangers, is
nondefective. As mentioned in Part I, examples include knives,
automobiles (with available safety technology), and ladders
(ditto). A product whose dangers cause it to fail a risk-utility
test, like a sander without teeth, is defective.
The problem in warning cases is that the risk-utility
calculus is different than in design cases. A challenged design
may pass a risk-utility test because its design cannot be altered
in such a way as to reduce or eliminate the danger. Warnings,
however, are both inexpensive and easy to include with or on a
product, at least in theory. A product with a warning will
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inevitably be safer than a product without one,92 and it seems
easy, at least with hindsight, to conclude that the product
should have contained a warning. Courts, egged on by
defendants, concluded that factfinders would reason as follows:
1. The product was dangerous, even though the
manufacturer did not know of the danger.
2. Knowledge of the danger is imputed to the
manufacturer.
3. Any reasonable person knowing of the danger would
have put a warning of the danger onto the product.
4. There was no warning on the product.
5. Therefore, the product was defective and the
manufacturer is liable.
Thus, courts decided that imputing knowledge of the
danger to the manufacturer was inappropriate, because the
imputation would lead to automatic liability in failure to warn
cases.
In design defect cases, manufacturers can defend
themselves by arguing that the danger (knowledge of which is
imputed) was not curable, at least not without destroying the
product or rendering it useless or prohibitively expensive, and
thus that there was no feasible alternative design. The product
may pass a risk-utility test in the absence of an ability to
eliminate or reduce the dangers, meaning that the product,
although dangerous, was reasonably so given the “state of the
art” of the technology at the time it was released, and therefore
was not defective.93 This “state of the art” defense applies solely
to design cases. No truly analogous defense is immediately
apparent in warning cases: there is nothing uninventable about
a warning, and it is almost always possible to convey one,
(although perhaps not a useful one). The Feldman court viewed
unknowability in warning cases as analogous to the lack of
ability to make a safer product in design cases, concluding that
unknowability should be a defense in failure to warn cases.94
92

At the very least, a warning will inform the consumer about dangers in the
product, and, if these dangers are unavoidable, permit an informed choice as to use of
that product.
93
This is not the same as requiring an alternative feasible design for the
product. The product is still tested under a risk-utility standard, but it must pass or
fail that test as it is, in the absence of an alternative feasible design.
94
This is what the court must have meant when it said “similarly, as to
warning[] [cases].” Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984). See also
Becker v. Baron Bros., 649 A.2d 613, 616-17 (N.J. 1994), in which the court analogized
the state-of-the-art defense in warning cases to the risk-utility arguments of design
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Other courts were all too eager to adopt the state of the art
defense in its warning cases guise, pursuant to which the
defendant would be allowed to argue that it was not feasible to
warn of the danger because the danger was unknowable. This,
of course, created a defense to strict products liability,
effectively eliminating the aspect that set it apart from
negligence-based liability in the first place. The only distinction
that remained was the allocation of the burden of proof.
The courts that embraced this analogy—that feasible
alternative design is to design defect as knowability of danger
defense is to failure to warn cases—missed the point of strict
products liability completely. Not only did this result leave
plaintiffs paying for injuries caused by manufacturers, it also
provided support for an unworkable analogy. Courts forgot the
most important part of strict products liability: the risk-utility
test. A dangerous product is not necessarily defective: it is only
defective if its risk is higher than its utility. Many of the
products that courts ruled defective in the absence of warnings
might not have been ruled defective at all, because their utility
might well have outweighed their dangers, even without a
warning. The dangerous aspect of the product must have also
caused injury, another aspect of strict products liability
neglected by the courts, at least in this context. If the presence
of a warning on a product would not have affected the use to
which the consumer put that product, then it is not defective
for failure to warn. Therefore, whether an injury was
“discoverable” at the time of manufacture should have no
bearing on whether the benefit of the product outweighs its
risk, and should not provide a defense. Such a determination is
completely irrelevant to defect.
A better analogy appears in the realm of informed
consent. The question in informed consent is: would a
reasonable patient, knowing of the undisclosed risk, have
elected the procedure anyway? The answer to this question is
often “yes.” For example, the plaintiff sues when he or she
develops polio after being vaccinated or after being exposed to
someone who was. The risk of developing polio from the vaccine
was not disclosed to the patient. Would a reasonable person,
knowing of the risk, have undergone the vaccination anyway?
It is perfectly possible that the answer to this is yes, and may

defect.
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even be “yes” as a matter of law.95 In fact, many informed
consent cases founder on precisely this causation shoal.96
Analogously, a court can decide that a product is not defective
as a matter of law, if there is a risk that a jury will impose
liability for a reasonably dangerous product.97
The risk-utility test and causation standards generate
two defenses in strict products liability cases. The first is the
argument that the product, even without a warning, was not
defective. Of course, having a warning would have been better,
but its absence might not make the product defective because
the product, even without a warning, might be of such high
utility that the failure to warn pales in significance. The second
is the argument that the plaintiff=s decision to use the product
did not depend on the warning. Had the plaintiff been warned,
he or she would have used the product anyway. The absence of
the warning does not make the product defective unless the
product without the warning fails a risk-utility test and the
absence of the warning affected the plaintiff=s decision to use
the product in the first place.
The irony of the demise of strict products liability, then,
is that all this retreating was unnecessary. It centered on a
fundamental mistake, an idea that defendants and many
scholars were able to sell to the courts. This idea was that
holding manufacturers strictly liable for failing to warn of
unknowable dangers was tantamount to absolute liability and
liability without defect. Manufacturers persuaded the courts
that they would be irretrievably damaged and unfairly affected
by such “absolute” liability. It is, after all, impossible to warn of
an unknowable danger.
Thus, the courts were frightened into believing that
liability for unknowable dangers was a form of absolute
liability: liability without defect. They were encouraged in this
belief by legions of articles, many authored by extremely
distinguished law professors, many of whom had, from the
start, opposed liability without fault,98 who successfully
95

See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa
1987) (holding that since informing the patient about a remote risk of death would not
have affected her decision whether to undergo the procedure, the failure to inform the
patient of the risk was not causally linked to her death).
97
See Jordan v. K-Mart Corp., 611 A.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding the sled is dangerous but not defective).
98
See, e.g., John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict
Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
96
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persuaded the courts that liability for unknowable dangers was
absolute, and unfair, liability. The syllogism worked like this:
1. Strict products liability had never been intended to
impose absolute liability.
2. Liability for unknowable dangers was liability
without defect, and therefore absolute.
3. Strict products liability should not impose liability
for unknowable dangers.
Understandably, the vast majority of courts, when
confronted by the issue as presented above, ruled that
manufacturers were not liable for unknowable dangers. This
process was perhaps assisted by the fact that the opinions in
which the original tests for defect had been developed all
involved products with eminently knowable dangers. Thus, the
courts were not only willing to reject what had been
conceptualized as absolute liability, they were able to do so
without disturbing precedent, using lack of knowability as a
means of distinguishing the case before them from prior cases
under § 402A.
The flaw in this analysis is that liability for failing to
warn requires that the product be defective in order for the
manufacturer to be held liable, an aspect ignored by those who
argue that liability for failing to warn of unknowable dangers is
absolute. Liability for unknowable dangers is liability without
defect if and only if defect is defined as including only
foreseeable (knowable) dangers. The original tests for defect, of
course, included no such requirement. All of the tests defined
defect in what came to be viewed as risk-utility terms. In other
words, a product is defective if it fails a risk-utility test, no
matter who knew what, when, about the product. A
manufacturer will not be liable for dangerous products, only for
defective ones. Liability is only absolute if the manufacturer is
held liable for all injuries caused by a dangerous product; it is
not absolute if the manufacturer is held liable only for all
injuries caused by a defective product.

Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of
Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263; James A Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983). For a more
complete listing of articles written by Henderson and Twerski see Jerry J. Phillips,
Achilles’ Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265 n.3 (1994).
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Confusion between the concepts of dangerousness and
defectiveness fed the terror of absolute liability.99 But whether
the danger was knowable or not, no manufacturer should be
liable unless that danger made the product defective—unless
the product failed a risk-utility test. Many of the products at
issue in the courts’ retreat from strict products liability—
prescription pharmaceuticals—were probably not defective at
all, because they would have passed a risk-utility test with or
without a warning. But since the courts were muddled about
the difference between dangerousness and defectiveness, they
never performed any kind of risk-utility test on these products,
preferring instead to dismiss the cases on the ground that
manufacturers could not be found liable for failing to warn of
unknowable dangers.
It is perhaps worth reiterating that no court in the
process of the retreat pointed out that the danger had been
unknown to the consumer as well, and that their refusal to
impose liability left the costs on the consumer. Refusing to hold
manufacturers liable does not make the costs go away; it
simply imposes them on someone else. Emphasizing the need
for an uninhibited pharmaceutical industry allowed courts to
sacrifice individual plaintiffs for the greater good, without
analyzing whether liability was appropriate in the first place.100
In many cases, the drug would probably have passed a riskutility test, perhaps as a matter of law; alternatively, the
plaintiff might have been unable to show that the presence of a
warning would have had an impact on the plaintiff=s conduct.
In order to avoid imposing liability for dangerous, but
non-defective products, courts, encouraged by various
academics and economic recessions,101 discarded strict products
liability altogether. As I have said in earlier articles, the
requirement that the danger be foreseeable basically
eliminates liability without negligence: if the danger were
foreseeable, the manufacturer who fails adequately to perform
a risk-utility test on the product was negligent in its design
99

See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1441 (1994) (“‘[D]angerousness’ represents a factual characteristic of a product,
while ‘defectiveness’ is a legal conclusion about that product.”); Empire, supra note 34,
at 1187 (concluding that defectiveness liability is about responsibility rather than
blame).
100
There was also no empirical evidence that pharmaceutical companies were
in fact inhibited by strict products liability.
101
See RAHDERT, supra, note 93, at 159-61.
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and/or marketing. In other words, under this theory of
foreseeability a product is defective when the manufacturer has
acted unreasonably in the face of a known danger. This is
negligence, not strict products liability.
It also follows that if, as many courts state, imputing
knowledge of the danger is the hallmark of strict products
liability, reinstating the requirement that the danger be
foreseeable eliminates the imputation of knowledge in all cases
in which the imputation is result determinative. This includes
all cases where the danger was unknowable at the time of
manufacture. With this approach, plaintiffs will lose all cases
involving unknowable dangers. They can win all others under a
negligence theory, and the availability of a strict liability
theory will not determine the result.
III.

THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE RESPONSE

As predicted, the Third Restatement codified the
abolition of the imputation of knowledge by defining defects in
terms of foreseeable risks.102 This, of course, does away with
liability for unknowable dangers in all circumstances. The
Third Restatement also established a risk-utility test as the
sole criterion for defect, eliminating any consumer expectation
test from the definition of defect, and it added the requirement
that the plaintiff prove a reasonable alternative design as a
“centerpiece.”103 As Professor Owen observed:
102

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998). This section provides, in
relevant part:
Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A
product:
....
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor,
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
103
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998); Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable
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The requirements of “foreseeability” and “reasonableness” in
subsections 2(b) and 2(c) effectively reconvert the products liability
standard for these types of cases to one of negligence—a rather
remarkable retreat from section 402A=s explicitly “strict” standard of
liability of the Second Restatement that most courts boldly
purported to apply to design and warnings cases for thirty years.
Thus, . . . subsections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Third Restatement
abandon the strict liability concept and employ negligence principles
in design and warnings cases.104

The use of the word “purported” by Professor Owen is
particularly relevant, given that courts had whittled away at
the imputation of knowledge and the consumer expectation test
over the years. The Third Restatement, however, made it
impossible for courts to ignore what they had done, and many
did not like what they saw.105
In one of the supreme ironies of modern tort
jurisprudence, upon meeting the Third Restatement, many
courts took a step back from what they had cavalierly
accomplished in abolishing the imputation of knowledge of
unknowable risks, and realized that there was no need to rule
out liability for such dangers. As this Part will show, many
decisions rejecting the Third Restatement and reinstating
strict products liability might have been decided differently
without it. In confronting the fact that manufacturers were
avoiding paying for injuries they caused, courts realized the
implications of requiring foreseeability, eliminating the
consumer expectation element, and demanding a reasonable
alternative design in order for liability to result. Many
rediscovered that letting manufacturers off the hook does not
make the costs go away. It simply leaves them on another
innocent party—the plaintiff. The Third Restatement sent
courts back to the roots of strict products liability, to the idea
that, as between two faultless entities, the party who caused
the injury, who designed the product, who sold it, who profited
from its availability, should pay for the injuries it caused. This
article takes the position that without its opponents pushing

Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1428 (1994).
104
David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 285
(1998).
105
Some courts, of course, followed the Third Restatement, even in the face of
their own prior precedent that would have required its rejection. See Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting earlier Massachusetts
law to follow Third Restatement).
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too far, too fast, this resurgence in strict liability might never
have happened.
The Third Restatement tried to transform strict
products liability into negligence—based liability in three
relevant respects: unknowable dangers, consumer expectation,
and the reasonable alternative design requirement. The first,
liability for unknowable dangers, was eliminated by requiring
foreseeability of danger as an element of defect. The second,
consumer expectation, was eliminated by the adoption of an
exclusive risk-utility test for defect. The third, liability in the
absence of a reasonable alternative design, was eliminated by
the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product could
have been made safer.
This article now turns to these three subjects by
examining their treatment under the Third Restatement and
subsequent court opinions addressing their role in products
liability.
A.

Unknowable Dangers

The Third Restatement requires that dangers be
“foreseeable” in both design and warning contexts before the
product can be found defective. By including foreseeability in
the definition of defect, the Third Restatement foreclosed any
liability for unknowable dangers in either the design or
warning context. The pronouncement that strict products
liability for unknowable dangers is dead may have been
premature, however. Judging from many of the opinions that
have been handed down since, the Third Restatement seems to
have constituted some sort of a wake up call, although not the
call its Reporters intended.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in refusing to exempt
manufacturers from liability for unknowable dangers,
implicitly rejected the Third Restatement’s call for just such an
exemption. The court in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.,
pointed out that “[f]oreseeability of harm is an element of
negligence. . . . In other words, strict products liability imposes
liability without regard to negligence and its attendant factors
of duty of care and foreseeability [of danger].”106 Nor does
liability for unknowable dangers constitute absolute liability:
106

629 N.W.2d 727, 745-46 (Wis. 2001). The use by the plaintiff must be
foreseeable, but the danger need not be. Id. at 747.
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the plaintiff must prove the product defective as well as
dangerous.107
It is perfectly correct to argue that the products liability
goal of enhancing product safety is not particularly well served
(if at all) by imposing liability for unknowable dangers. But the
conclusion that this lack of congruence justifies eliminating
liability for unknowable dangers altogether only follows if
enhancing product safety is the only, or even the most
important, goal of imposing liability in the first place. The
Green court rejected this contention:
[The argument that product safety is not encouraged by liability for
unknowable dangers] focuses on one public policy underlying strict
products liability while ignoring a second, more important policy
consideration. Although products liability law is intended in part to
make products safer for consumers, the primary “rationale
underlying the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and
sellers is that the risk of the loss associated with the use of defective
products should be borne by those who have created the risk and
who have reaped the profit by placing a defective product in the
stream of commerce.”108

The court in Green refused to allow a knowability
defense, adhering instead to a pure consumer expectation test
which does not involve examination of what the manufacturer
knew and when the manufacturer knew it.
The Green opinion is particularly noteworthy for its
detailed analysis and rejection of the defendant’s contention
that the evolution of Wisconsin law prior to Green required
that the danger be foreseeable in order for the manufacturer to
be liable for injuries caused by that danger. The defendant,
with some support, argued that earlier opinions had settled
Wisconsin law as establishing that strict product liability
would not apply in cases where “a manufacturer does not and
cannot foresee the risk of harm presented by its product.”109 The
court painstakingly analyzed away earlier opinions cited by the
defendant, reaching the conclusion that Wisconsin law did not
embody a knowability requirement.110 It further refused to
adopt the Third Restatement, which it viewed as a change to
its own law. Not only did the newest Restatement fail to serve
“the policies underlying strict products liability law,” said the
107
108
109
110

Id. at 746.
Id. at 750 (quoting Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990)).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745-751.
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court, it added both the requirement that the plaintiff prove
negligence and a reasonable alternative design to the burden
on the consumer. The court refused to “impose such a burden
on injured persons.”111
The Supreme Court of Montana also refused to adopt a
knowability requirement in Sternhagen v. Dow Co.112 The court
adhered to its imputed knowledge test, stating that “[u]nder
the imputation of knowledge doctrine, which is based on strict
liability’s focus on the product and not the manufacturer’s
conduct, knowledge of a product’s undiscovered or
undiscoverable dangers shall be imputed to the manufacturer.
Our adoption of the imputation of knowledge doctrine [brings
with it a] concomitant rejection of the state-of-the-art
defense.”113
Sternhagen and Green differ from Beshada in one
important respect. Like Beshada, they impose liability for
unknowable dangers. Like Beshada, they are true to the
original formulations of the tests for defect, the imputation of
knowledge and the consumer expectation tests, respectively.
But they differ from Beshada in one important respect: timing.
They come at the end of the process of dismantling strict
products liability, not at the beginning, and represent a return
to the doctrine’s first principles. The Beshada court, writing at
the beginning of strict products liability, simply followed its
own definition of defect in imputing knowledge to the
manufacturer, refusing to create an exception for unknowable
dangers. Sternhagen and Green, on the other hand, were
written after an exception for unknowable dangers had been
created. They are all the stronger for confronting the
arguments that led to the development of the Third
Restatement, then rejecting them. Sternhagen and Green
should prove more durable than Beshada, if only because they
confront the years of backtracking and return to the doctrine’s
origins: given a choice between leaving the costs of a defective
product on an innocent consumer and placing them on the
manufacturer, the choice is clear. The manufacturer should
pay.

111
112
113

Green, N.W.2d at 752.
935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997).
Id. at 1143.
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Consumer Expectation Test

The Third Restatement eliminated any consumer
expectation tests from its concept of products liability, adopting
an exclusive risk-utility test instead.114 This cleverly removed
another means by which manufacturers might be liable for
unknowable dangers, because such knowability is irrelevant to
what the consumer might or might not have expected from the
product at issue.115 Removing the consumer from the products
liability equation is highly significant, and symbolic of the
orientation of the Third Restatement towards protecting
manufacturers.116 As has been discussed above, courts that fled
from liability for unknowable dangers focused exclusively on
the impact of such liability on manufacturers, not on the
impact of non-liability on the injured consumer. It seems
appropriate that the Third Restatement, which eliminated any
liability for unknowable dangers, would also, like the courts
before it, remove the consumer from the determination of
defectiveness altogether.
Confronted by this newly imposed consumer invisibility,
and feeling a renewed need to respond to it, courts and some
legislatures have rejected removal of the consumer from the
equation. In Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP Inc., the court not
only reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer expectation
test, but also reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer
expectation test as the sole test of defectiveness, even in cases
involving open and obvious dangers and complex products, two
areas where the consumer expectation test had proved
problematic. When the danger is open and obvious, the Green
court pointed out, the product will pass a consumer expectation
test, but suit may be brought for “negligence, breach of implied

114

Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182-83 (N.H.
2001) (stating that § 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts requires proof of a
reasonable alternative design in design cases, and pointing out that, under New
Hampshire law, proof of a reasonable alternative design is only one possible factor to
be considered under a risk-utility analysis)
115
Green, 629 N.W.2d at 742.
116
One commentator has pointed out that various sources characterize § 2(b)
of the Restatement (Third) as “a wish list from manufacturing America.” Douglas A.
Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1727 n.116 (2003)
(quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 n.16 (Wis. 2001)
(quoting Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 261, 261 (1997))).
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warranty, or breach of express warranty.”117 Complexity of the
product was simply irrelevant, in the court’s view, because the
issue was whether “the product falls below . . . minimum
consumer expectations,” and not the “scientific understanding
of the product itself . . . . This court frequently has upheld use
of the consumer-contemplation test in cases involving complex
products.”118 In vigorously reaffirming its commitment to the
consumer expectation test, the Green court renewed its
dedication to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
firmly rejected the Third Restatement’s formulations.
The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, and in Delaney v.
Deere & Co. renewed its commitment to the consumer
expectation test by rejecting both an exclusive risk-utility
approach and the requirement of a reasonable alternative
design:
[W]e agree that as the foreword to the Third Restatement makes
clear, the new Restatement “goes beyond the law.” Hazard, Foreword
to Restatement (Third) of Torts, xv, xvi (1997). Rather than simply
taking a photograph of the law of the field, the Third Restatement
goes beyond this to create a framework for products liability. We
have examined Comment 1 and find it wanting. The adoption of
Comment 1 necessarily involves the adoption of the reasonable
alternative design standard and an exclusive risk-utility analysis of
that reasonable alternative design to determine whether the subject
product is defective. This is contrary to the law in Kansas. To
summarize the law in Kansas, whether a design defect in a products
exists is determined using the consumer expectations test.119

Other courts have come to the same conclusion. As in
Delaney, a number of courts have rejected the Third
Restatement’s reliance on a risk-utility test and its
requirement of a reasonable alternative design because these
tests reject the consumer expectation standard altogether. As
the court stated in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., in the
course of rejecting the Third Restatement, “[T]he defendants
propose that it is time for this court to abandon the consumer
expectation standard and adopt the requirement that the
plaintiff must prove the existence of a reasonable alternative
design in order to prevail on a design defect claim. We decline
to accept the defendants’ invitation.”120 Unlike the court in
117

Green, 629 N.W.2d at 743.
Id. at 742.
119
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000).
120
694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997). See also Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999
P.2d 930, 945 (Kan. 2000) (The Kansas Supreme Court Justices stated: “However,
118
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Green, however, the Potter court did not view consumer
expectation as the sole test of defectiveness:
Although today we adopt a modified formulation of the consumer
expectation test, we emphasize that we do not require a plaintiff to
present evidence relating to the product’s risks and utility in every
case. . . . [T]he ordinary consumer expectation test is appropriate
when the everyday experience of the particular product’s users
permits the inference that the product did not meet minimum safety
expectations. Conversely, the jury should engage in the risk-utility
balancing required by our modified consumer expectation test when
the particular facts do not reasonably permit the inference that the
product did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary
consumer.121

Refusing to adopt § 6(c) of the Third Restatement, and
salvaging consumer expectation as an important part of
products liability, another court remarked:
Next, defendant asks us to adopt section 6(c) of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Product liability. That section provides:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in
relation to is foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.
This section completely eliminates appraisal of the
consumer’s expectations from determination of whether a
medical device is unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the section
conflicts with Illinois law.
Moreover, the section provides manufacturers with virtual
immunity from liability for all medical products. Even when
Kansas has consistently held that evidence of a reasonable alternative design may but
is not required to be introduced in a design defect action. Kansas has not used the
concept of reasonable alternative design to become the standard by which the
questioned product is measured.”) (internal citation omitted); Couch v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the availability of a
reasonable alternative design is “not a necessary element of a plaintiff’s burden” in a
defective design action).
In all fairness, it must be said that the Potter court did not include liability
for unknowable dangers within the scope of strict products liability, ruling that
manufacturers could only be liable for knowable dangers. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1328-29.
The dangers in that case, however, were not unknowable. Id. at 1326. Potter also
indicated that there might be cases involving complex products in which consumer
expectation would not be an appropriate test because “an ordinary consumer may not
be able to form expectations of safety.” Id. at 1333.
121
Potter, 694 A.2d at 1335 (citations omitted).
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doctors discover unexpected injuries due to a medical device,
they may find the device useful in some extreme cases. . . .
Under section 6(c), the fact that the device remains useful
for some patients would immunize the manufacturer from
liability.
Commentators have noted that section 6(c) represents a
substantial departure from established common law
throughout the country. . . . Most courts that have
considered related provisions of the Restatement (Third)
have refused to adopt them.122

This last quotation, highly significant in terms of the
subject matter of this article, indicates that the Third
Restatement forced courts to take another look at where strict
products liability had been and where it was going. The
necessity for this reexamination was generated by Third
Faced with the total exclusion of
Restatement itself.123
consumers from products liability law, many courts rejected the
Third Restatement and adhered to the law they had developed
under the Second.
C.

Reasonable Alternative Design

The Third Restatement defines design defect in terms of
the availability of an alternative feasible design. Under the
Third Restatement, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a

122

Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(internal citations omitted).
123
For other courts and opinions rejecting the Third Restatement and
approving the consumer expectation test, see Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d
800, 802 (Tenn. 2001) (reaffirming that, under Tennessee law, the consumer
expectation test “is applicable to any products liability claim where the plaintiff
intends to show that a manufacturer is liable for plaintiff’s injuries as a result of an
unreasonably dangerous product”); Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th
Cir. 2003) (affirming that the Kansas courts will continue to use the consumer
expectation test as laid out in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defective
design claims); Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681, 683-84 (7th Cir.
1998); McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., Nos. 02-2229-KHV, 02-2230-KHV, 02-2231-KHV,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11712, at *20-21 (D. Kan. July 8, 2003) (reiterating this point);
Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 2d 473, 486-87 (D. Md. 2001)
(adopting the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth circuits in Haddix and Papike). In
Haddix, the court cited with approval the holding in Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107
F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997), and held that the risk of contracting Toxic Shock Syndrome
was within an ordinary consumer’s knowledge and so, even though the jurisdiction
allows for use of either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility test, in
defective design cases where you have “a simple product which poses an obvious
danger” the risk-utility test is inapplicable and the consumer expectation test must be
applied. Haddix, 138 F.3d at 684, 686.
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reasonable alternative design in order to show that the
product’s design was defective.
Ironically, the trend toward incorporating risk-utility
analysis into a consumer expectation test with the goal of
broader protection in cases of obvious product danger
metamorphosed into the Third Restatement’s abolition of the
consumer expectation test, with its alternative goal of
shrinking consumer protection. “Substitution of a risk-utility
analysis, however, especially as formulated in the Restatement
(Third), has attracted considerable criticism and has been
viewed as a retrogression, as returning to negligence concepts
and placing a very difficult burden on plaintiffs.”124 The
Supreme Court of Kansas reacted with horror to the Third
Restatement’s requirement of a reasonable alternative design:
The Third Restatement’s requirement that a plaintiff produce a
reasonable alternative design has been harshly criticized. See
Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design
Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U.
MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996); Frank Vandall, State Judges Should Reject
the Reasonable Alternative Design Standard of the Restatement
(Third), Products Liability, Section 2(b), 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62
(1998); Westerbeke, The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement,
8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 66 (1998). Vandall states that the
reasonable alternative design requirement is not supported by public
policy or economic analysis because the cost of processing a case will
make it economically impossible to produce a reasonable alternative
design in a small products liability case. 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at
63. Further, contrary to the view of the authors of the Third
Restatement that the majority of states require a reasonable
alternative design to establish a design defect, research by John F.
Vargo indicates that very few states in fact have this requirement.
See 26 U. MEM. L. REV. at 550-553. Vargo, in his exhaustive review,
examines the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ claim that “reasonable
alternative design” is the majority rule in this country and concludes
that, far from a majority rule, only three states require a reasonable
alternative design and five do so by statute. See Appendix IV and
related textual support for author’s conclusions, 26 U. MEM. L. REV.
at 951, 501-951.125

124

Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. 2002). The court
further pointed out that, despite efforts by the Reporters of the Third Restatement to
portray this as the majority view, it was unclear that most courts would agree with this
position, and, “to the extent that it is shared, it has been criticized as representing an
unwanted ascendency of corporate interests under the guise of tort reform.” Id. at
1154-55.
125
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945-46 (Kan. 2000).
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The goal of requiring a reasonable alternative design
was clearly retrogressive. Under this standard, manufacturers
would never be liable unless the product could have been made
safer. In other words, there would be no such thing as a
product that was unavoidably dangerous and defective. Under
the Third Restatement, manufacturers would only be liable for
products with curable dangers, and never for product designs
that could not be changed to reduce or eliminate hazards.
This shift in focus to protecting manufacturers is all the
more pernicious because strict products liability was developed
to protect consumers.126 The focus should be on the injured
consumer and the product that caused the injury, and not on
the manufacturer’s conduct. Focus on the manufacturer’s
conduct amply appears in negligence based doctrine, but strict
products liability was supposed to be something else.
Faced with the Third Restatement, however, courts
have realized that products liability doctrine is at risk of losing
the attributes that led to its development in the first place. In
few contexts is this clearer than in that of prescription drugs.
Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement pronounces that a
prescription pharmaceutical is only defective if no doctor would
ever prescribe it to any “class of patients” for any condition. It
is highly unlikely that any plaintiff could ever meet this burden
of proof, as it is hard to imagine a drug that has passed
through the FDA processes and is not useful to any patient
whatsoever. As one court pointed out:
The Third Restatement was intended as “a complete overhaul” of the
Second Restatement. These changes have garnered substantial
criticism. In particular, 6(c) has been criticized for its failure to
reflect existing case law, its lack of flexibility with regard to drugs
involving differing benefits and risks, its unprecedented application
of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact that a consumer’s
claim could easily be defeated by expert opinion that the drug had
some use for someone, despite potentially harmful effects on a large
class of individuals. To date, no court has adopted the Third

126

See Andrew F. Popper, Tort Reform Policy More Than State Law
Dominates Section 2 of the Third Restatement, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 38, 40 (1999):
Controversy happens when you deal with a product that is made by a
company that is not negligent and the product ends up killing people, and
there is no readily available alternative, or the cost of producing an available
alternative is prohibitive. In that area, the Restatement fails you, as judges,
and, more importantly, fails the public.
Id. at 41.
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Restatement’s strict liability test for prescription drugs, and one
court has explicitly refused to adopt the test.127

The Third Restatement thus brought out in the codified open
what courts had been comfortable doing on a case by case basis.
Eliminating the consumer expectation test in favor of a
risk utility test is one thing when its dilution is designed to
further the goal of consumer protection, as was the case when
it was modified so as to avoid precluding liability for open and
obvious hazards. It is quite another when the goal of its
abolition is to protect manufacturers, a goal that becomes
patently clear when the risk-utility test is coupled with the
requirement of a reasonable alternative design. In Vautour v.
Body Masters Sports Industries, the court pointed out that
adopting a risk-utility test did not automatically mean that the
plaintiff had to prove a reasonable alternative design. “The
plaintiffs’ burden was to present evidence regarding the riskutility factors; they did not have the duty of proving a safer,
alternative design.”128 Risk-utility tests can exist in the absence
of a reasonable alternative design requirement, and “the rigid
prerequisite of a reasonable alternative design places too much
emphasis on one of many possible factors that could potentially
affect the risk-utility analysis.”129 Requiring a reasonable
alternative design simply brought the goal of deterring
lawsuits out in the open. The Vautour court decided that “the
risk-utility test as currently applied protects the interests of
both consumers and manufacturers in design defect cases, and
we decline to adopt section 2(b) of the [Third] Restatement.”130
There has been considerable controversy surrounding the adoption of
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b). Most of the controversy stems
from the concern that a reasonable alternative design requirement
would impose an undue burden on plaintiffs . . . . Commentators
have noted that for suits against manufacturers who produce highly
complex products, the reasonable alternative design requirement
will deter the complainant from filing suit because of the enormous
costs involved in obtaining expert testimony. Thus, because of the
increased costs to plaintiffs of bringing actions based on defective
product design, commentators fear that an alternative design
requirement presents the possibility that substantial litigation

127

Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(internal citations omitted).
128
784 A.2d 1178, 1184 (N.H. 2001).
129
Id.
130
Id.
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expenses may effectively eliminate recourse, especially in cases in
which the plaintiff has suffered little damage.131

The Sternhagen court likewise refused to adopt the
Third Restatement=s requirement of a reasonable alternative
design, comprehensively rejecting the Third Restatement on
several grounds simultaneously:
We decline to extend [the requirement of a reasonable alternative
design] to cases where alternative designs did not exist and a
product’s dangers were undiscovered or undiscoverable at the time of
manufacture. If we were to do so, we would inject negligence
concepts into Montana’s strict products liability law and eviscerate
the public policy underlying strict products liability law in this
State.132

Injecting negligence concepts into strict products
liability law was, of course, precisely the goal of the Third
Restatement. Indeed, as the courts point out, there is nothing
left of strict products liability under the Third Restatement.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE BITER BIT

The Third Restatement forced courts to confront their
own roles in eliminating protections for injured plaintiffs and
the potential for further harm the Restatement’s ratification
could create. It is this recognition of the doctrine’s erosion and
the resultant need to confront it that has caused, even
compelled courts—to return to strict products liability. Once
the changes that had gradually been made under § 402A were
openly accepted, courts recognized how far strict products
liability had strayed from its origins and goals, and realized
that the Third Restatement was at risk of abolishing it
altogether. For the same reasons that strict products liability
was originally adopted, the courts are now in the process of
reaffirming their commitment to retaining—or reinstating—
the doctrine.133
The Third Restatement did one of two things in every
jurisdiction in which it was invoked. In some jurisdictions, it
codified the law as it had developed over the years, with
rejection of liability for unknowable dangers, elimination of the
consumer expectation test, and a requirement of a reasonable
131
132
133

Id. at 182-83 (internal citations omitted).
Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997).
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000).
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alternative design. This forced courts in those jurisdictions to
confront the fact that strict products liability had been
incrementally eroded almost to the point where it had ceased to
exist. In other jurisdictions, it provided courts with a view of
strict products liability in contrast to the current one in place.
This led courts to reexamine their prior law, developed under
the Second Restatement, and in some cases, to reaffirm their
commitment to that law. In providing a mirror for examination
of strict products liability law, the Third Restatement
frequently stood up poorly to the challenge of the Second,
leading courts to take positions contrary to those expressed in
the Third. Those advocating abandoning strict products
liability might have done better to leave it alone, allowing the
incremental process to continue its work.
In short, the Third Restatement made explicit what
courts had implicitly been doing in ruling that manufacturers
would not be liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers,
for design defects in the absence of an alternative feasible
design, or for products that failed consumer expectation tests.
In this very explicitness lay the seeds of a renewal for strict
products liability. Courts, more comfortable with exempting
manufacturers from liability for products that failed a riskutility test on a case by case basis, had to confront the blanket
nature of manufacturer exemption from liability for injuries to
consumers who (like the manufacturers) could not avoid injury
but who (unlike the manufacturers) were not responsible for
and did not profit from the availability of the product. Faced
with an uncompromising rule, courts, like the Sternhagen
court, have come to recognize the fundamental unfairness of
exempting manufacturers from paying for the injuries their
products caused. Strict products liability has returned, and we
ironically owe this return to the Third Restatement.
What the Third Restatement did was prove too much.
The pro-defendant trend, which the Third Restatement
attempted to codify and encourage, had occurred, where it
existed, without close scrutiny. It happened gradually, and in
small steps that allowed courts to avoid confronting the plight
into which consumers were being cast by their rulings. But
turning this incremental phenomenon into a rule, as the Third
Restatement did, pushed the courts too far and to hard down
the slippery slope. It meant that the courts could no longer
ignore what their own rulings had so subtly accomplished. It
has also caused the re-examination of the ALI as an
appropriate policy-making entity, leading to questions about
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whether the ALI is any more qualified to make policy than the
courts.134
It is, of course, true that in the process of ruling in
individual cases the courts were making bad law. A prime
example is the rule that manufacturers could not be liable for
failing to warn of unknowable dangers. The breadth of these
rulings is breathtaking. But the route to liability through later
distinctions between cases remained open. Feldman could
pretend it was not overruling Beshada, and Brown could
pretend it was limited to prescription pharmaceuticals, leaving
its extension to all products to Anderson. In a common law
area, distinguishing earlier precedent to achieve a different
result is itself an art. But when the rule is codified, such
distinctions are no longer so easy to draw, ignore, or rationalize
away.
When the courts were faced with the Third
Restatement, they were taken back to the days before strict
products liability, when all agreed that consumers needed
protection from dangerous and defective products, protection
that negligence standards could not supply. The rationale
behind strict products liability was that manufacturers should
be liable, even in the absence of negligence, because it was
appropriate that manufacturers compensate equally innocent
plaintiffs for injuries caused by defective products. Instead of
adopting the Third Restatement, many courts have returned to
the idea that gave birth to strict products liability in the first
place: as between innocent plaintiffs and innocent
manufacturers, the manufacturers should pay for the injuries
caused by their defective products.
The causal link between the Third Restatement and the
renewal of strict products liability cannot be directly proven.
Rather, circumstantial evidence leads to the conclusion that
the Third Restatement, far from promoting the retreat from
strict products liability, has caused its revival. First, opinions
like Sternhagen carefully analyze the Third Restatement,
making explicit exemptions that had earlier been implicit or
disguised in opinions that rejected liability for unknowable
dangers. Second, it seems unusual that the revival of strict
products liability should occur in today’s world, where
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See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 761, 766 (1998) (“[T]he processes of the ALI may have no comparative advantage
with political institutions in making choices among political arguments.”).

2/22/2005 7:18:58 PM

2005]

THE BITER BIT

937

conservatism is rampant and corporations are more powerful
than ever. The recessions of the 1980s allowed corporations to
cry poverty and persuade courts to rule in their favor, cutting
back on laws that would have led to liability. The market
failures of this decade should, at least in theory, produce the
same results. The factor that differentiates this era from the
1980s, however, is the very presence of the Third Restatement.
Third, for lack of any other reason that would explain
Sternhagen and its progeny other than the Third Restatement,
I am left with a res ipsa loquitur of causation argument: post
hoc, ergo propter hoc.

